

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
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United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued February 19, 2026
Decided July 17, 2026

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, *Circuit Judge*

DORIS L. PRYOR, *Circuit Judge*

JOSHUA P. KOLAR, *Circuit Judge*

No. 25-2132

ESTATE OF ANTHONY
MOURADIAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JACKSON COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin.

No. 23-cv-167-wmc

William M. Conley,
Judge.

ORDER

Anthony Mouradian, a pretrial detainee at the Jackson County jail, struggled with his mental health before tragically committing suicide on May 28, 2020. His Estate brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Jackson County, various jail officials, and the jail psychologist, Dr. Ashley Hakes violated the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to provide him with adequate medical care. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the Estate’s federal constitutional claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.

Although the district court’s articulation of the appropriate legal standard could have been more precise, we agree with the district court that the Estate’s constitutional

claims fail under the objective reasonableness inquiry articulated in *Kingsley v. Hendrickson*, 576 U.S. 389, 395–97 (2015) and affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

We construe the record in the light most favorable to the Estate, the nonmoving party, and construe all reasonable inferences from the evidence in its favor. *Bostic v. Murray*, 160 F.4th 831, 836 (7th Cir. 2025).

A. Factual History

On July 30, 2019, Anthony Mouradian was arrested and booked into the Jackson County jail located in Black River Falls, Wisconsin. From the time he was arrested through his booking and intake, Mouradian repeatedly expressed suicidal thoughts and stated plans to self-harm. Based on his words and behaviors, the jail placed Mouradian on suicide watch. The sergeant on duty for Mouradian’s booking, Thomas Sharp, then emailed the jail psychologist, Dr. Ashley Hakes, concerning Mouradian. Sergeant Sharp also contacted Northwest Connections, a 24/7 emergency crisis line that had contracted with Jackson County to provide mental health services, to explore involuntary or emergency commitment pursuant to Chapter 51 of the Wisconsin Statutes. *See* WIS. STAT. §§ 51.15, 51.20 (“Chapter 51”). While on suicide watch at the jail, Mouradian was required to wear protective clothing, a smock gown, and remain in a padded cell without toilet or water access. Jail officers monitored Mouradian every 15 minutes.

Two days later, and after meeting with the jail’s social worker, Mouradian continued to express suicidal thoughts and announce his plans to self-harm. Accordingly, the jail scheduled Mouradian to meet with Dr. Hakes. Dr. Hakes assessed Mouradian on August 2, 2019, and, in what became her usual practice, prepared notes along with an email summary of her session. Dr. Hakes shared these notes with various jail officials and instructed them to keep Mouradian on suicide watch.

On August 9, 2019, following her session with Mouradian, Dr. Hakes released him from suicide watch and requested that the jail’s advanced nurse practitioner promptly meet with Mouradian for medication implementation and management.¹ After she released Mouradian from suicide watch, Dr. Hakes regularly met with him to assess his mental health and recommend actions to the jail regarding his overall safety

¹ As a psychologist, Dr. Hakes is not licensed to prescribe medication. *See* App. Dkt. 20, Dr. Hakes Appellate Br., at 15 n.1; District Court Dkt. 120-11, Dr. Hakes Contract with Jackson County jail.

and protection. Dr. Hakes requested that the jail accommodate Mouradian by providing him with specific items or permitting him to participate in activities aimed at improving his mental health condition. Dr. Hakes also made recommendations concerning Mouradian's housing within the jail. From August through November, Dr. Hakes and Mouradian met on a regular basis. In mid-November, during one of their sessions, Dr. Hakes provided Mouradian with the first two chapters of a book exploring positive psychology for long-term incarceration. The following week, Mouradian refused to meet with Dr. Hakes. During this time, Mouradian had also learned that the State offered him a plea of five years in prison to resolve his pending state charges.

Starting in late December 2019 through mid-February 2020, Mouradian began sporadically refusing his mental health sessions with Dr. Hakes. Dr. Hakes noted Mouradian was depressed and attempted to assist with his mood. Dr. Hakes recommended that the jail change Mouradian's cell placement and that the jail's advanced nurse practitioner reevaluate him to determine whether a medication adjustment was appropriate. After receiving another chapter of the positive psychology for long-term incarceration book from Dr. Hakes, Mouradian again refused his mental health session. Around this time, Dr. Hakes believed Mouradian was not responding to her attempted intervention methods.

The day before Mouradian's plea hearing in his criminal case, in February 2020, Dr. Hakes was scheduled to meet with Mouradian, however, he refused. Considering the timing of the canceled session with the upcoming court proceeding, Dr. Hakes advised jail staff to "be cognizant of any changes in [Mouradian's] presentation[.]"

The next day, February 21, 2020, Mouradian attended his plea hearing. After defense counsel informed the court that Mouradian had been "looking around his cell for something to hang himself with" the night before, the state court judge continued the hearing to March 13, 2020. Once notified of Mouradian's actions the night before his plea hearing, Dr. Hakes immediately emailed jail officials requesting that Mouradian be placed on suicide watch because of his "high suicide risk." The jail complied with Dr. Hakes's directive.

Dr. Hakes then met with Mouradian on February 28, 2020, and referred him to Northwest Connections for an assessment because Mouradian's persistent suicidal thoughts, his intent to self-harm, and the potential for further harm concerned her. A crisis worker with Northwest Connections assessed Mouradian that same day and recommended emergency detention. The jail agreed, completing a standard law enforcement emergency detention form pursuant to Wisconsin Statute § 51.15.

Mouradian was temporarily detained and placed under the supervision of Sacred Heart Hospital.

On March 2, 2020, Dr. Hakes emailed Sacred Heart, communicating Mouradian's history of depression and suicidal ideation. The next day, Jackson County Circuit Court determined the jail's allegations that Mouradian posed a substantial probability of physical harm to himself were sufficient to warrant emergency detention. WIS. STAT. § 51.20 (7); *see also* WIS. STAT. § 51.15 (1). On March 5, 2020, Dr. Hakes emailed the jail's social worker and Sacred Heart to recommend Mouradian be placed at a mental health hospital, which could provide him with more intensive programming until he became sufficiently stable to return to the jail.

Mouradian was transferred to the Winnebago Mental Health Institute on March 13, 2020 for stabilization. That same day, Mouradian was prescribed fluphenazine, in addition to the current slate of medications the jail's advanced nurse practitioner ordered him to take. He also signed a 90-day settlement agreement with the county, agreeing to a specific treatment plan that included meeting with Dr. Hakes weekly and taking his medication as prescribed. Jackson County Circuit Court stayed Mouradian's commitment determination pending successful completion of the terms of the settlement agreement.

Mouradian was under emergency detention for eighteen days before he was discharged from the Winnebago Mental Health Institute. Upon discharge, Winnebago Mental Health Institute deemed Mouradian suitable to return to the jail. Mouradian was diagnosed with major depressive disorder. Mouradian returned to the jail without any heightened precautions. Dr. Hakes did, however, recommend that Mouradian be placed in a two-man cell upon his return. She also encouraged the jail's advanced nurse practitioner to assess Mouradian to ensure he would receive the medication prescribed for him at the Winnebago Mental Health Institute. After a mental health session with Mouradian on March 20, 2020, Dr. Hakes observed that he was better than he had ever been. Dr. Hakes also recorded that Mouradian reported decreased suicidal ideation during their session on March 27, 2020.

On April 10, 2020, during her session with Mouradian, Dr. Hakes learned that Mouradian was having negative effects from the new medication prescribed at the Winnebago Mental Health Institute. Dr. Hakes emailed the jail's advanced nurse practitioner that same day, expressing Mouradian's desire to stop taking the medication and requested a reevaluation. Dr. Hakes also recommended that the jail allow Mouradian to work a laundry job. From her perspective, the laundry job would be

beneficial to Mouradian because it would allow him to leave his cell, it was an actual activity to get him moving, and it would allow him to write letters and listen to the radio in between his running of the laundry loads.

On April 14, 2020, ten days before his rescheduled plea hearing, Mouradian was observed wrapping a towel around the bars of his cell and looking around his cell, as if he might be searching for a place to tie something and self-harm. One of the jail officials on duty emailed the jail supervisors advising them to “keep an extra eye out on Mouradian.” After consulting with Dr. Hakes about the jail’s observations, supervisors directed the night shift to enlarge the camera view of Mouradian’s cell/bunk area to ensure proper observation of him throughout the night. Dr. Hakes also emailed jail officials questioning the benefit of returning Mouradian to Winnebago Mental Health Institute. The next day, the jail’s advanced nurse practitioner met with Mouradian and discontinued his prescription for fluphenazine. On April 24, 2020, Mouradian pled no contest to his pending state charges. In compliance with his settlement agreement with Jackson County, Mouradian continued to meet with Dr. Hakes consistently.

In May 2020, the jail’s social worker followed up with Dr. Hakes, requesting an update on Mouradian. Dr. Hakes acknowledged that Mouradian was compliant with the terms of the 90-day settlement agreement filed pursuant to Chapter 51. When Dr. Hakes questioned the possibility of extending the settlement agreement, the jail’s social worker informed Dr. Hakes that no extension was possible unless Mouradian failed to comply with the terms of the settlement agreement. On May 7, 2020, Jackson County Circuit Court dismissed Mouradian’s 90-day settlement agreement, and his case was closed.

Almost a week after his Chapter 51 case was closed, Mouradian declined a session with Dr. Hakes. On May 20, 2020, Dr. Hakes met with Mouradian and later described the session as productive and noted Mouradian’s active participation. Dr. Hakes concluded improvements were soon to come.

Approximately seven days later, on May 27, 2020, Officers Lucas Johnson and Linda Keller were scheduled to work the night shift at the jail, which ran from 6:00 P.M. to 6:00 A.M. the next morning. Officer Johnson was assigned the floor-officer role and Officer Keller the control-room officer role. Under the jail’s protocols, the control-room officer’s duties included “locking and unlocking jail doors to facilitate officer and inmate movements inside the jail, answering radio traffic from dispatch and from officers within the jail, answering incoming phone calls to the jail,” and monitoring the camera feeds on monitors. The camera feeds showed the control-room officer when to

lock and unlock doors to facilitate officer and inmate movement around the jail. The night shift officers were also responsible for performing timely wellness checks of all inmates in each cell block.

Officer Johnson, as the floor-officer, performed a cell check on Mouradian and the other inmates around 1:21 A.M. on the morning of May 28, 2020. About five minutes later, at 1:27 A.M., Mouradian was captured on the jail's camera feed putting a blanket over his head and moving towels around the opening of his cell door to seal it.

Approximately 30 minutes later, Mouradian is seen on the camera feed placing a towel through the opening between the bars of his cell door. Minutes later, the camera records Mouradian tying his towel in a way that, when connected with his bed sheet, created a noose. Mouradian then bends down to place the noose around his neck and waves goodbye to the camera. Mouradian tragically hung himself in clear view of the jail's camera feed. During this time, Officer Johnson was preparing to assume control-room officer duties, and Officer Keller was preparing to assume floor-officer duties.

Officer Keller left the control room around 2:13 A.M. After reaching Mouradian's cell and observing the noose, Officer Keller attempted to assist Mouradian by calling for help to Officer Johnson. Both officers assisted in removing Mouradian from his cell. Mouradian was later transported to the hospital where he was pronounced dead.

B. Procedural History

On March 15, 2023, the Estate brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against Jackson County and various jail personnel in their official capacities, and Dr. Hakes, individually. Eventually, the defendants moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted.

This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

We review de novo a district court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment. *Breyley v. Fuchs*, 156 F.4th 845, 847 (7th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted). A party is entitled to summary judgment when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). "Parties genuinely dispute a material fact where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." *Stockton v. Milwaukee County*, 44 F.4th 605, 614 (7th Cir. 2022) (citation modified). "A party who fails to produce evidence

sufficient to establish an element essential to that party's case on which they bear the burden of proof cannot survive a summary judgment challenge." *Lee v. Milwaukee County*, 175 F.4th 877, 883 (7th Cir. 2026) (citation omitted).

We can also "affirm summary judgment on any ground supported in the record, provided the parties adequately addressed the issue in the district court and the non-moving party had an opportunity to contest it." *See Arwa Chiropractic, P.C. v. Med-Care Diabetic & Med. Supplies, Inc.*, 961 F.3d 942, 946 (7th Cir. 2020).

A. Legal Frameworks

Under the Constitution, "[i]ncarcerated persons have a constitutional right to receive adequate medical treatment, including mental health treatment and protection from self-harm." *Pittman ex rel. Hamilton v. Madison County*, 108 F.4th 561, 566 (7th Cir. 2024) (citation modified). The scope of this constitutional right depends on the incarcerated individual's classification within the criminal justice system. *Id.* (citation omitted).

1. Eighth Amendment

For convicted prisoners, the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause protects against "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners" by "prison doctors" and "prison guards." *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). "To determine if the Eighth Amendment has been violated in the prison medical context, we perform a two-step analysis, first examining whether a plaintiff suffered from an objectively serious medical condition, and then determining whether the individual defendant was deliberately indifferent to that condition." *Petties v. Carter*, 836 F.3d 722, 727–28 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). This subjective standard is closely linked to the language of the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments." *Miranda v. County of Lake*, 900 F.3d 335, 350 (7th Cir. 2018) (emphasis omitted).

2. Fourteenth Amendment

Pretrial detainees, those who have not been convicted of anything, may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process. *Id.* Thus, the Supreme Court explained the appropriate standard for a pretrial detainee's medical care claims is found not in the Eighth Amendment but in the Fourteenth Amendment's jurisprudence. *Kingsley*, 576 U.S. at 396–400; *see also Bell v. Wolfish*, 441 U.S. 520, 534–36

(1979). Under this standard, we explained in *Pittman ex rel. Hamilton v. Madison County* that the pretrial detainee needs to show only that the defendant's conduct was objectively unreasonable. 108 F.4th at 570. In other words, a pretrial detainee satisfies this standard by putting forth evidence that "reasonable officers under the circumstances would have understood the high degree of risk involved, making the consequences of the defendants' conduct obvious." *Id.* at 572 (emphasis omitted).

B. Analysis

On appeal, the Estate maintains that the district court erred in two ways: (1) applying the Eighth Amendment's subjective professional judgment standard to grant summary judgment for Dr. Hakes and (2) finding the County Defendants' failure to monitor the camera feed to Mouradian's cell on the night of his death did not violate Jackson County jail policy for purposes of *Monell* liability. See *Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.*, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

In response to the first error, Dr. Hakes maintains the district court properly utilized the Eighth Amendment's subjective standard because Mouradian was no longer a pretrial detainee at the time of his death. Because the Estate was unable to demonstrate her conduct fell below the professional standard, Dr. Hakes argues that the Estate's claim fails against her. In addressing the Estate's second error, the County Defendants contend that, even under the objective standard, its officers were entitled to rely on the medical provider's professional judgment and there is no policy or custom requiring correctional officers to observe inmates constantly within a jail, even when those inmates are placed on precautions or suicide watch.

We address each argument in turn.

1. Dr. Hakes

Beginning with Dr. Hakes, the Estate argues the district court erred because it applied a subjective prong to its Fourteenth Amendment inadequate medical care claim. The district court reasoned, "[i]n the context of a claim for inadequate medical care" arising under the Fourteenth Amendment, "*the professional judgment standard requires essentially the same analysis as the Eighth Amendment standard.*" This proposition finds support in our caselaw prior to the Supreme Court's decision in *Kingsley*. Compare *Minix v. Canarecci*, 597 F.3d 824, 831 (7th Cir. 2010) ("Although the Eighth Amendment applies only to convicted persons, pretrial detainees ... are entitled to the same basic protections under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause ... [so] we apply the

same legal standards to deliberate indifference claims brought under either the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment.”) *with Miranda*, 900 F.3d at 343–44. But *Pittman* corrected the “tension, if not inconsistency,” by explaining pretrial detainees “in a medical care case need not prove a defendant’s subjective awareness of the risk of harm to prevail on a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim.” 108 F.4th at 569–70.

Capitalizing on our circuit’s interpretation following *Kingsley*, the Estate claims the district court’s error warrants reversal. Dr. Hakes, in response, defends the district court’s decision, arguing that Mouradian’s status in the jail at the time of his death was more analogous to a convicted prisoner than a pretrial detainee, triggering the Eighth Amendment, which applies a subjective test to a medical-care claim. *See Bell*, 441 U.S. at 535 n.16 (“A sentenced inmate, on the other hand, may be punished, although that punishment may not be ‘cruel and unusual’ under the Eighth Amendment.”); *Kingsley*, 576 U.S. at 399 (explaining that the incarcerated person “ha[d] been accused but not convicted of a crime). Whether the Estate’s claim of inadequate medical care for Mouradian is analyzed under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment ultimately makes no practical difference to our resolution of the challenges in this appeal because the Estate has failed to demonstrate that Dr. Hakes’s actions were objectively unreasonable.

Here, the Estate’s expert, Dr. Eugene Braaksma, testified that he “could not comment on [] other reasonable professional[s]” and would not offer “a conclusion about” whether a reasonable professional in Dr. Hakes’s shoes would have acted similarly. That inability left the Estate without any evidentiary proof to challenge the appropriateness of Dr. Hakes’s conduct. Dr. Hakes assessed Mouradian’s mental health in over twenty near-weekly sessions over seven months, summarized each session in an email and notes to the jail, advocated for his mental health needs and other privileges, provided him educational materials, promptly requested re-evaluations from the jail’s advanced nurse practitioner when his behavior prompted it, and continued to advocate on his behalf to county officials and jail personnel.

Because the Estate has offered no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that a reasonable professional in Dr. Hakes’s shoes would have responded differently, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Dr. Hakes.

2. County Defendants

Next, the Estate argues the district court erred in granting the County Defendants’ summary judgment motion because they had an independent obligation to monitor Mouradian on the night of his suicide and their failure to do so was objectively

unreasonable. While we recognize the unfortunate set of circumstances surrounding Mouradian's death, the Estate's argument fails.

First, the official capacity claims against Sheriff Waldera, Captain Bowe, Officer Keller and Officer Johnson are treated as claims against Jackson County. *Grieverson v. Anderson*, 538 F.3d 763, 771 (7th Cir. 2008). "Governmental entities cannot be held liable for the unconstitutional acts of their employees unless those acts were carried out pursuant to an official custom or policy." *Id.*; see also *Monell*, 436 U.S. at 694. Thus, to survive summary judgment on a § 1983 official capacity claim against Jackson County, the Estate needed to present evidence demonstrating Mouradian suffered a constitutional violation, and the official policy, custom, or practice caused the alleged constitutional violation. *Perkins v. Lawson*, 312 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 2002); *Wagner v. Washington County*, 493 F.3d 833, 836 (7th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). In other words, for the Estate's claims against the County Defendants to survive, the Estate must:

- (1) show that [Mouradian] was deprived of a federal right;
- (2) trace the deprivation to some municipal action (i.e., a policy or custom) attributable to the municipality itself;
- (3) show municipal fault; and
- (4) show that the municipal action was the moving force behind the federal-rights violation.

Lee, 175 F.4th at 884 (citation modified). Looking at these standards, we begin with the most basic element of the Estate's *Monell* claim: whether Mouradian suffered a constitutional injury. Accepting the Estate's position that Mouradian was a pretrial detainee at the time of his death, the Estate was still required to show that the care Mouradian received was objectively unreasonable—that is, insufficient to abate a "serious risk of harm" from a reasonable officer's perspective. *Pittman*, 108 F.4th at 571–72.

On this record, we accept that Mouradian's mental health issues rose to the level of an "objectively serious" medical need requiring a level of treatment necessary to avoid a substantial risk of harm and that the County Defendants were aware of this serious medical condition. See, e.g., *Lee*, 175 F.4th at 885. The problem for the Estate, however, is that it has not put forth specific, articulable evidence that would allow us to assess whether the care the County Defendants did provide, through Dr. Hakes, was objectively insufficient to meet this serious need. The record contains evidence that Mouradian received a variety of mental health services while he was detained at the

jail—crisis intervention, behavioral counseling, medication management, and housing adjustments. As noted above, the Estate’s expert failed to identify how Jackson County’s treatment, through Dr. Hakes, was objectively unreasonable. Without this evidence, we have no basis to conclude that Jackson County’s actions were constitutionally deficient. Because the Estate did not put forth specific, admissible evidence demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact on whether the medical care Mouradian received at the jail was objectively unreasonable, the Estate failed to meet its burden. And without demonstrating an underlying constitutional violation, we do not reach the “policy or custom” inquiry of *Monell*. *Id.* at 886. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the County Defendants.

C. Remaining Issues

Because the Estate has failed to demonstrate an underlying constitutional violation, we decline to address the County Defendants’ qualified immunity defense. *See, e.g., Whitman v. Nescic*, 368 F.3d 931, 936 (7th Cir. 2004), *as amended* (June 4, 2004). Second, we find that the district court properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Estate’s state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). *See Fuqua v. SVOX AG*, 754 F.3d 397, 401 (7th Cir. 2014).

III. CONCLUSION

While we are sympathetic to the unfortunate events in this case, the Estate has failed to demonstrate Dr. Hakes’s actions or the County Defendants’ actions were objectively unreasonable. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.