

**NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION**

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1

**United States Court of Appeals**

**For the Seventh Circuit**

**Chicago, Illinois 60604**

Submitted February 24, 2026\*

Decided February 25, 2026

**Before**

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, *Chief Judge*

THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, *Circuit Judge*

JOSHUA P. KOLAR, *Circuit Judge*

No. 25-2302

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
*Plaintiff-Appellee,*

*v.*

DAVID J. TAYLOR,  
*Defendant-Appellant.*

Appeal from the United States District  
Court for the Southern District of  
Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:21-cr-00090-JMS-MJD

Jane Magnus-Stinson,  
*Judge.*

**ORDER**

David Taylor, a federal prisoner, appeals from the denial of his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The district court concluded

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\* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

that Taylor failed to establish an extraordinary and compelling reason for early release. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.

In 2021, Taylor pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, *see* 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, *see* 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced him to 12 years' imprisonment followed by 8 years' supervised release.

In 2025, Taylor moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). In his motion, he cited his extensive health problems—most notably, a heart condition known as idiopathic hypertrophic obstructive cardiomyopathy. He asserted that the prison—USP Terre Haute in Terre Haute, Indiana—cannot provide adequate care, *see id.* § 1B1.13(b)(1)(C), because the Bureau of Prisons' record system does not recognize this specific condition as a formal diagnosis. He also stated that he was the only available caretaker in his family for his 85-year-old incapacitated grandmother. *See id.* § 1B1.13(b)(3)(D). And he referred to his rehabilitative efforts—specifically, coursework he completed while incarcerated.

The district court denied Taylor's motion, determining that he failed to demonstrate an extraordinary and compelling reason for relief. With regard to Taylor's health, the court found that he had received ongoing and consistent treatment for his medical conditions, including his heart condition, and he had not shown that necessary specialized care was unavailable. As for Taylor's family circumstances, the court deemed insufficient his evidence (emails from his grandmother, along with his own statements) that she was incapacitated or that he was the only available caretaker. The court also found that rehabilitation, when considered alone or together with any other reason, was not a basis to grant compassionate release to Taylor.

On appeal, Taylor maintains that the Bureau cannot adequately manage his medical condition, which he says will deteriorate. But Taylor has the burden of proving an extraordinary and compelling reason, *see United States v. Barbee*, 25 F.4th 531, 532 (7th Cir. 2022), and he offered insufficient evidence that his medical care is inadequate. To the extent he thinks the court failed to consider his rehabilitation in conjunction with his other arguments, the court commended him on his accomplishments in prison but reasonably found that they did not tip the balance. And rehabilitation—without more—cannot constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for release. *See United States v. Peoples*, 41 F.4th 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2022).

Finally, Taylor asserts that the district court erred by failing to consider the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). But once the court determined that no extraordinary and compelling reason warranted a reduction in his sentence, it did not need to proceed to the next step and assess the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. *See United States v. Williams*, 65 F.4th 343, 345–46 (7th Cir. 2023).

AFFIRMED