

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted December 22, 2025*
Decided January 6, 2026

Before

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, *Chief Judge*

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, *Circuit Judge*

AMY J. ST. EVE, *Circuit Judge*

No. 24-2957

JUDSON HOOVER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DENNIS REAGLE, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Terre Haute Division.

No. 2:23-cv-00510-JPH-MJD

James Patrick Hanlon,
Judge.

ORDER

Judson Hoover, an Indiana prisoner, appeals the judgment dismissing his civil rights complaint against three prison officials. Because Hoover failed to show cause why his complaint should not have been dismissed, we affirm.

* The appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this appeal. After examining the appellant's brief and the record, we have concluded that the case is appropriate for summary disposition. *See* FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2).

Hoover sued three officials at the Pendleton Correctional Facility in Pendleton, Indiana, for depriving him of his personal property after his transfer from Wabash Valley Correctional Facility in Carlisle, Indiana. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court screened Hoover's complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and dismissed it for failure to state a claim. The court explained that the mere loss of Hoover's property did not state a constitutional claim and that Hoover was not owed any process beyond that provided in the Indiana Tort Claims Act. *See* IND. CODE § 34-13-3-7. The court then gave Hoover two additional months to show cause why his suit should not be dismissed.

Hoover did not respond to the court's directive, and the district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.

On appeal, Hoover does not contest the correctness of the district court's decision, nor does he provide any case law or legal argument that would cast doubt on the ruling. Although we construe pro se briefs liberally, an appellate brief must contain a discernible argument challenging the district court's reason for dismissal and support for that argument. *See* FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(8)(A); *Atkins v. Gilbert*, 52 F.4th 359, 361 (7th Cir. 2022).

To the extent Hoover challenges the district court's denial of three requests he made for the assistance of counsel, we see no error. The court properly dismissed Hoover's first motion because he did not show that he tried to find counsel on his own or that he was precluded from doing so. *Thomas v. Anderson*, 912 F.3d 971, 978 (7th Cir. 2018). Although the court did not address Hoover's second and third motions (which did not elaborate on why he believed he could not litigate the case on his own), the court was entitled to use available information and its own experience to assess the possible merits of the case and assign priority accordingly. *McCaa v. Hamilton*, 959 F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 2020); *see Pruitt v. Mote*, 503 F.3d 647, 658–59 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc).

We have considered Hoover's other arguments, and none has merit.

AFFIRMED