

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted August 12, 2025*

Decided August 12, 2025

Before

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, *Circuit Judge*

JOHN Z. LEE, *Circuit Judge*

JOSHUA P. KOLAR, *Circuit Judge*

No. 24-2607

BRADY PALMER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JORDAN PRIDE,
Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin.

No. 23-cv-182-wmc

William M. Conley,
Judge.

ORDER

Brady Palmer, a resident of Black River Falls, Wisconsin, appeals the grant of summary judgment rejecting his claim that a local police officer issued him a “bogus” parking ticket in retaliation for critical remarks he made at a city council meeting. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We affirm.

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

In 2016, Palmer attended a meeting of the Black River Falls city council and complained that drug paraphernalia was present in the city, examples of which he produced, that police were not investigating. At the meeting, the mayor instructed Palmer to report the issue to the police, but Palmer never did. Palmer was later issued a citation for possessing the drug paraphernalia.

In 2021, Jordan Pride joined the Black River Falls Police Department. Over the next year and a half, Pride interacted with Palmer frequently, typically in response to calls that Palmer initiated or complaints made by others about Palmer. In July 2022, Pride issued a parking ticket for a car that turned out to be Palmer's. According to Palmer, Pride issued the citation to retaliate against him for complaints he had made at the 2016 city council meeting. The ticket was eventually dismissed, though Palmer conceded (in these legal proceedings) that he had parked beyond the 15-minute limit.

Palmer sued Pride for retaliation in violation of his rights under the First Amendment. The court, however, granted summary judgment for Pride because no reasonable factfinder could conclude that there was a causal connection between Palmer's remarks at the city council meeting and the parking citation six years later.

On appeal, Palmer asserts only that he did not make the statements attributed to him by Pride and the district court. But Palmer's brief, which is three sentences long, fails to develop any meaningful argument why the district court erred. We are mindful of Palmer's pro se status, *see Anderson v. Hardman*, 241 F.3d 544, 545–46 (7th Cir. 2001), but he still must comply with Rule 28(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and explain why he believes the district court's decision was incorrect, *see Cole v. Comm'r*, 637 F.3d 767, 772–73 (7th Cir. 2011). And the court did not err. Palmer failed to produce any evidence in response to Pride's motion for summary judgment, so the court appropriately accepted Pride's version of the facts. *See* FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); *Allen-Noll v. Madison Area Tech. Coll.*, 969 F.3d 343, 348–49 (7th Cir. 2020). Based on these facts, no reasonable jury could conclude that Palmer's remarks at the city council meeting were a motivating factor for—let alone related to—the citation that Pride issued six years later. *See Adams v. Reagle*, 91 F.4th 880, 887–88 (7th Cir. 2024); *FKFJ, Inc. v. Village of Worth*, 11 F.4th 574, 586 (7th Cir. 2021).

AFFIRMED