NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit[*]
Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted January 27, 2025
Decided January 27, 2025

Before

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, *Circuit Judge*

THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, *Circuit Judge*

NANCY L. MALDONADO, *Circuit Judge*

No. 24-2675

VETHAPRIYA CHELLAPPA CHANDRASEKARAN, a/k/a VPROSEJD CC,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, *et al.*,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 24-cv-603-wmc

William M. Conley,
Judge.

O R D E R

Vethapriya Chandrasekaran appeals the dismissal of her suit in which she asserts that the United States, Republic of India, and others thwarted her from receiving billions of dollars. The district court correctly dismissed the suit as frivolous, and we affirm. (The court referred to Chandrasekaran with he/him pronouns, but on appeal Chandrasekaran refers to herself as a woman; thus we use she/her pronouns.)

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[*] The appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this appeal. After examining the appellant's brief and the record, we have concluded the case is appropriate for summary disposition. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

Chandrasekaran appears to demand that the United States and Republic of India pay her over $3 billion for "100 years of labor" on a volunteer project and for failing to educate corporations about their duties to the poor, disabled, and homeless. She also believes that the other defendants owe her billions of dollars in backpay for blocking her from becoming a Justice of the United States Supreme Court, the governor of Wisconsin, and the Roman Catholic Pope, among other jobs. The district court allowed her to proceed in forma pauperis, but it dismissed the complaint, at screening, as frivolous. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

Chandrasekaran appeals, but she does not engage with the district court's decision, which was correct. We are mindful of Chandrasekaran's pro se status, *see Anderson v. Hardman*, 241 F.3d 544, 545–46 (7th Cir. 2001), but she is still required to comply with Rule 28(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and include an argument explaining why the district court's decision was incorrect. *Cole v. Comm'r*, 637 F.3d 767, 772–73 (7th Cir. 2011). In any event, the district court correctly dismissed Chandrasekaran's suit as frivolous. Her claims against United States and the Republic of India fail because she has not identified any exception to their sovereign immunity. *See Dep't of Agric. Rural Dev. Rural Hous. Serv. v. Kirtz*, 601 U.S. 42, 47 (2024); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604; 1605. And her claims against the other defendants—that they frustrated her prospects of sitting on the Supreme Court and atop other institutions—are frivolous because she has not alleged plausible facts. *See Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Nor has she identified on appeal, as she must, any legal theories that would establish their liability. *See Kirksey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.*, 168 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 1999). Finally, because we cannot discern any potential non-frivolous claims, that is, any plausible claims for relief that would not be barred by sovereign immunity, we agree with the district court that any amendment would be futile.

We conclude with a comment about Chandrasekaran's fee status on appeal. Ordinarily, permission to proceed in forma pauperis before the district court permits the party to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. *See* FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(3). But when a district court decides that a suit is frivolous, it should certify that the appeal is taken in bad faith and revoke the order authorizing the appeal to proceed in forma pauperis. *See Lee v. Clinton*, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026–27 (7th Cir. 2000). We therefore REVOKE Chandrasekaran's permission to take this appeal in forma pauperis.

AFFIRMED