

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 10, 2024*

Decided May 10, 2024

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, *Circuit Judge*

AMY J. ST. EVE, *Circuit Judge*

JOHN Z. LEE, *Circuit Judge*

No. 23-3040

ALIYAH MONROE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

TIMOTHY McDOWELL,
Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Illinois.

No. 3:23-cv-02854-SPM

Stephen P. McGlynn,
Judge.

ORDER

* The appellee was not served with process and is not participating in this appeal. We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the appellant's brief and the record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. *See* FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

A state court issued a child-custody decision that required Aliyah Monroe to split custody with the child's father. Monroe sued the father, invoking federal diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and asked a federal district court to “vacate” the custody decision. The court dismissed the case based on two limits to federal jurisdiction. The first is the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine, which bars federal district courts from hearing cases brought by state-court losers who complain of injuries caused by state-court judgments and seek review and rejection of those judgments. *Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.*, 544 U.S. 280, 283–84 (2005) (citing *Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co.*, 263 U.S. 413 (1923); *D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman*, 460 U.S. 462 (1983)). The second is the domestic-relations exception to federal diversity jurisdiction, which bars federal courts from adjudicating “divorce, alimony, and child custody” matters. *Ankenbrandt v. Richards*, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992). Both rationales provide an independent basis for dismissal, and we affirm.

Monroe alleges the following, which we take as true for purposes of this appeal. *See Sherwood v. Marchiori*, 76 F.4th 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2023). In 2018, Monroe and Timothy McDowell had a child together in Illinois. Later, Monroe moved to Florida, and McDowell moved to Missouri. After they had each left the state, an Illinois court awarded split custody: It required that the parents exchange the child in Tennessee (initially, every two weeks, but now every four weeks). The state court warned Monroe that if she was found in contempt of the order, it would assign primary custody to McDowell.

On appeal, Monroe argues that the district court had jurisdiction to overturn the state court's child-custody decision because, in her view, the state court lacked jurisdiction over non-state residents. *See* 750 ILCS 36/202. But asking a federal district court to redress a state court's judgment—even one that is allegedly unauthorized under state law—falls squarely within *Rooker-Feldman*'s prohibition. *See Exxon Mobil Corp.*, 544 U.S. at 284; *Mains v. Citibank, N.A.*, 852 F.3d 669, 676 (7th Cir. 2017).

The domestic-relations exception to federal diversity jurisdiction, which Monroe does not address on appeal, provides another basis for us to affirm. State courts have “special proficiency” in handling child-custody decisions, *Marshall v. Marshall*, 547 U.S. 293, 308 (2006) (quoting *Ankenbrandt*, 504 U.S. at 704), and Monroe's challenge to the custody decision is blocked by the statutory-based exception to federal diversity jurisdiction for custody disputes. *See Arnold v. Villareal*, 853 F.3d 384, 387 n.2 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing *Friedlander v. Friedlander*, 149 F.3d 739, 740–41 (7th Cir. 1998)).

AFFIRMED