

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted February 10, 2020*
Decided February 11, 2020

Before

MICHAEL S. KANNE, *Circuit Judge*

DIANE S. SYKES, *Circuit Judge*

AMY J. ST. EVE, *Circuit Judge*

No. 19-1959

CASA STUCKEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.

v.

No. 18-cv-4004

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.,
Defendant-Appellee.

John Z. Lee,
Judge.

ORDER

After Casa Stuckey defaulted on his mortgage loan in 2010, Bank of America brought a foreclosure action against him in Illinois state court. The state court entered a judgment of foreclosure and sale against Stuckey in 2017 and approved a sheriff's sale in 2018 through which Bank of America bought the property. Stuckey responded by suing the bank in federal district court weeks later. In his complaint he alleged that the bank "cannot own property," so the district court had to "annul" the state court's order granting it ownership and give Stuckey "full possession." The district judge concluded

* We agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the issues have been authoritatively decided. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(B).

that Stuckey was impermissibly seeking federal-court review of a state-court decision. The judge therefore dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine.

On appeal Stuckey does not address the judge's reasoning, nor does he develop any other arguments that would enable an appellee to respond. Bank of America therefore asks us to dismiss this appeal for failure to comply with our briefing rules. *See* FED. R. APP. P. 28. It also argues alternatively that the district court correctly dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

We affirm the dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Although we agree with Bank of America that Stuckey's brief is deficient, what is also clear is that Stuckey, a "state-court loser[]," has asked the federal district court to "review and reject[]" the state court's final judgment—precisely what *Rooker-Feldman* prohibits. *Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.*, 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (citing *Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co.*, 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923); *D.C. Cour of Appeals v. Feldman*, 460 U.S. 462, 482–86 (1983)). Stuckey's complaint challenges the Illinois court's judgment of foreclosure and asks the federal district court to "annul" that ruling. "Claims that directly seek to set aside a state court judgment are *de facto* appeals that are barred without further analysis." *Jakupovic v. Curran*, 850 F.3d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 2017).

AFFIRMED